Take The Long Road: Pension Fund Investments and Economic Stagnation by Berry, CP
Berry, CP (2015)Take The Long Road: Pension Fund Investments and Eco-
nomic Stagnation. UNSPECIFIED. The International Longevity Centre – UK
(ILC-UK).
Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/620793/
Publisher: The International Longevity Centre – UK (ILC-UK)
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
  
Take the long road? 
Pension fund investments and economic stagnation 
 
Dr Craig Berry 
 
 
November 2015 
www.ilcuk.org.uk  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The International Longevity Centre - UK (ILC-UK) is a futures organisation focussed on some of 
the biggest challenges facing Government and society in the context of demographic change. 
The ILC-UK is a registered charity (no. 1080496) incorporated with limited liability in England  
and Wales (company no. 3798902). 
 
ILC–UK 
11 Tufton Street 
London 
SW1P 3QB 
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7340 0440 
www.ilcuk.org.uk 
 
This report was first published in November 2015 © ILC-UK 2015 
 
About the author 
Craig Berry is Deputy Director of the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute and an 
Associate Fellow of ILC-UK. His previous roles include Policy Advisor at HM Treasury, Pensions 
Policy Officer at the TUC, and Head of Policy and Senior Researcher at ILC-UK. Follow Craig on 
twitter at @craigpberry. 
 
The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the official views of the International Longevity Centre – UK (ILC-UK). 
 Table of Contents 
Executive summary .................................................................................... 4 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 6 
What do we know about pension fund investment allocations? ................. 7 
The coalition government's infrastructure agenda ...................................... 9 
Risk-sharing: gone and soon forgotten .................................................... 11 
Regulation, ageing and economic change ............................................... 13 
The limitations of responsible investment ................................................ 14 
Policy options ........................................................................................... 16 
References ............................................................................................... 19 
 
4 
Executive summary 
Improving the long term investment rate of the UK economy is vital to supporting 
infrastructure renewal and technological development, which sustain economic growth in 
capitalist economies through increasing productive capacity. Improving UK productivity is also 
essential to ensuring that the UK can bear a higher old age dependency ratio as the 
population ages. Given their vast capital holdings, pension funds were identified by the coalition 
government as central to efforts to increase long term investment (and of course the pensions 
system is directly affected by the implications of population ageing, insofar as it is reflected in 
scheme membership demographics). 
However, we do not know a great deal about how pension funds invest. Several high-level 
trends are identifiable from the available evidence, such as large scale de-equitisation in favour of 
fixed income assets, and overall these trends suggest a growing tendency towards short-termism. 
But detailed data is limited, especially given the move towards insurer-run defined contribution 
schemes. Furthermore, it is difficult to jump from evidence of short-termist investment 
practice to the conclusion that pension funds are employing short-termist investment 
strategies. There are a large number of issues which cloud any assessment of short- and long-
termism, such as the relative lack of control of trustees over specific investment decisions in trust-
based schemes, limitations and inconsistencies in how certain asset classes are reported and 
categorised, and the sometimes paradoxical role of ostensibly short term investments in 
supporting long term investment, by pension funds or in the economy more generally (and vice 
versa). 
This paper defines long-termism broadly in terms of investors accepting a degree of uncertainty in 
investment decisions, rather than simply risk. The possibility of significant returns depends on the 
investment itself, or the investor, having a transformative impact on the recipients of the 
investment, or the environment within which they operate. Long term investments are dynamic. 
On these terms, it is clear that the UK pensions system is not sufficiently geared towards 
facilitating long term investment by pensions funds, and that the coalition government’s policy 
agenda in this regard – largely taken forward by the Conservative majority government – was not 
focused on addressing the key barriers. A ‘nudge’ agenda, typified by the establishment of the 
Pensions Infrastructure Platform, has failed to encourage greater pension fund investment 
in infrastructure, and indeed symbolises the coalition’s excessive (and quite moralistic) focus on 
public sector pension schemes. Insofar as pension funds are investing in infrastructure, they are 
using securitised debt instruments to replace rather than augment public investment. 
The dismantling of risk-sharing mechanisms within the UK pensions systems is one of the 
main reasons that pension funds have been unable to embrace the uncertainty of genuinely 
long term investments. This process has intensified since 2010. We also have to recognise the 
strengthening of the regulatory environment around pensions saving. Although designed to protect 
members’ savings, too often regulation has had the impact of disabling the potential for long 
term investment, not least due to its interaction with population ageing. The fixation of regulators 
on scheme funding has distracted us from the most important way of protecting members, that is, 
scheme governance arrangements. 
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Some stakeholders – and indeed policy-making elites – have sought to equate long-termism with 
the agenda around responsible investment. A stronger focus by pension funds on issues 
around corporate stewardship would probably be beneficial to the prospect of increasing 
long term investment (although the evidence is mixed) – yet this is the most under-
developed aspect of the responsible investment agenda. John Kay’s review of long term 
decision-making in UK equity markets strongly endorsed stewardship, yet failed to consider why 
specific group of investors, such as pension funds, have thus far resisted greater responsibility for 
corporate stewardship. 
The most important policy priority in terms of enabling long term investment by pension funds is to 
defend defined benefit provision. There are various ways in which this could be done, but the 
paper advocates, in particular, mechanisms for adjusting pension entitlements as pension 
scheme demographics change. This will allow defined benefit schemes to respond to population 
ageing in a way that is less disruptive to investment strategies. It is also possible to make defined 
contribution provision operate more like defined benefit provision, through the introduction of 
collective defined contribution (CDC) schemes. The government should explore how to 
transform NEST into a CDC scheme, but must also reverse recent pensions ‘liberation’ reforms to 
enable large employers to adopt CDC in place of individualised defined contribution. 
The government should also establish national and local economic renewal funds. These 
would be funded by near-compulsory allocations by all workplace pension schemes. Any individual 
or firm would be able to bid to the fund for investment, into projects consistent with improving the 
productive capacity of the UK economy. A more moderate version of this proposal would see 
existing pension schemes compelled to develop investment strategies more commensurate 
with the geographical location of their UK workforce. 
The paper also advocates an enhanced role for the state in supporting pension funds to facilitate 
long term investment through its unrivalled capacity to hedge risks, including offering 
hypothecated investment bonds to institutional investors and providing annuities to 
defined contribution savers.  
6 
Introduction 
The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent stagnation in the UK economy gave renewed 
prominence to one of its longstanding handicaps. The relative lack of long term investment within 
the UK economy can be associated with both the housing market and asset price booms which 
created significant volatility in the pre-crisis period, and with the sluggishness of the post-recession 
recovery which has ostensibly been underway since late 2009. 
Improving the long term investment rate of the UK economy is vital to supporting infrastructure 
renewal and technological development, which sustain economic growth in capitalist economies 
through increasing productive capacity. Productivity is one of the key weaknesses of the UK 
economy, relative to most similar economies; overcoming this will be essential to ensure that the 
UK can bear a higher old age dependency ratio as the population ages. 
Pension funds lie at the centre of this undesirable status quo. They are, to some extent, the victims 
of the UK’s economic short-termism. The economy is not creating sufficient opportunities for long 
term investment to which pension funds can allocate significant amounts of capital. The withdrawal 
of public investment since the recession by the coalition government, and now Conservative 
majority government, since 2010 has, somewhat perversely, exacerbated this trend. 
Furthermore, the increasing unwillingness of employers to support traditional ‘defined benefit’ (DB) 
pension schemes means that the associated funds have less capital to invest. This trend is evident 
in the closure of existing schemes to new members or future accruals, or a downgrading of 
entitlements associated with scheme membership, both of which generally reduce contributions 
into schemes. It is of course most evident, however, in the replacement of DB provision with 
‘defined contribution’ (DC) schemes, which are generally less able to pursue long term investment 
strategies. 
On the other hand, pension funds can be said to be perpetrators of the UK’s chronic economic 
short-termism (although certainly not the main perpetrators). UK pension funds are hugely 
significant capital market participants. Their embrace of securitisation in the 1990s had a 
transformative impact on investment practice in the City of London. More generally, pension funds 
also highly value liquidity in investment – that is, assets that can be traded quickly – and tend to 
trade some assets at a relatively high frequency in order to track investment benchmarks. 
These changes, however, are strongly associated with pension funds’ efforts to reorient their 
investment practice in light of the maturity of their membership demographic. Scheme 
memberships of most DB funds reflect both the ageing of the UK population in general, and the 
consequences of closing schemes to new, younger members. As such, while demographic change 
with pension scheme membership profiles means that the higher yields generally associated with 
long term investment are more important than ever to ensuring scheme sustainability, it is the cash 
demands related to a higher proportion of pensions-in-payment, relative to accumulating funds, 
that means the greater liquidity of short term investments is prized by the pensions system. 
Given the vast size of UK pension funds, it is not surprising that policy-makers have looked to 
them in the post-crisis environment to reorient their investment practice towards the long term. 
Such a move would ostensibly facilitate the kind of ‘real economy’ investments that would 
strengthen the economic recovery. But many questions about this agenda remain unanswered. Is 
reorientation in pension fund investment practice a realistic prospect? Is it fair on pension funds – 
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and scheme members – to expect them to shoulder this burden? Has policy been sufficiently 
focused on addressing the causes of short-termism in pension fund investments, and the barriers 
to a more long-termist approach? This paper seeks to address these issues, in order to outline a 
series of policy options for enabling long-termism in pension fund investments. 
Part of the problem, however, is that what long term investment actually looks like is not always 
clear. There is also an acute shortage of detailed data on how pension funds invest, especially in 
terms of the balance between short and long term investments. The first section briefly outlines 
what we know about pension funds’ existing capital allocations, and explores the difficulty of 
establishing what qualifies as a long term investment. The next four sections look at different 
aspects of this policy area, including the agenda around increasing infrastructure investment, the 
prospect of new forms of risk-sharing (and how the increasing need for liquidity impacts upon this 
prospect), the role of regulation in shaping pension fund investments, and the controversial issues 
of responsible investment and corporate stewardship. The final main section considers what role 
the state could play in enhancing long term investment by pension funds, before the conclusion 
summarises the paper’s arguments and offers a series of recommendations. 
 
What do we know about pension fund investment 
allocations? 
This section summarises the available evidence on pension fund investments, before considering 
what, if anything, can be inferred about the time horizons of these investments. As noted in the 
Introduction, however, the evidence on pension fund investments is frustratingly limited. The 
Pension Protection Fund’s (2014) Purple Book is perhaps the most comprehensive source. It 
contains information on private sector defined benefit schemes, where the majority of pension 
assets remain. Key findings from the latest edition are: 
 Equity investment has fallen sharply to around a third of total asset allocation, from around two-
thirds before the financial crisis. 
 Within equity investment, overseas equities now strongly outweigh UK equities – the two were 
roughly equal at the time of the financial crisis. 
 Over the same period, allocations to gilts and fixed interest securities has risen from under 30 
per cent to around 45 per cent.  
 This has been a marked increase in holdings of cash deposits, doubling to 6 per cent of total 
asset allocations since 2008. 
 There has been a steeper increased in allocations to hedge funds, from a negligible amount at 
the time of the financial crisis, to almost 6 per cent. 
The over-riding trend is one of de-equitisation, a process which was evident many years before the 
financial crisis. A study on procyclicality in UK institutional investment following the financial crisis 
by the Bank of England and the Procyclicality Working Group (2014) found that decisions over 
equity allocations were largely ‘acyclical’. While there was some evidence of counter-cyclicality 
(buying more equities as prices fell), which we might translate as a long-termist approach to 
investment, this was largely due to a mechanical adjustment to falling prices, as a given asset 
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allocation balance was maintained. In general, the longstanding move towards de-equitisation, 
essentially a form of de-risking, was maintained irrespective of the crisis, and actually had 
procyclical affects insofar as it contributed to falling equity prices. 
Moving away from equities investment, and towards gilts and similar assets, reflects scheme 
maturity, as equities are usually more volatile than gilts. We can see a similar dynamic in the 
moves towards cash deposits and hedge funds – although the latter is a volatile investment, it 
offers significant liquidity. This is important in schemes were an increasing number of members 
are in retirement.  
The Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2014) publishes data on investment by both insurance 
companies and pension funds, therefore encompassing virtually the entirety of pensions saving 
vehicles in the UK. However, the data is limited in several regards: 
 Although the ONS distinguishes ‘general’ insurance providers from ‘long term’ insurance 
providers, it does not distinguish pension-related investment within the long term category (and 
therefore, nor does it distinguish pension-related insurance investments associated with the 
accumulation and decumulation phases). 
 Within data on pension funds, there is no distinction between defined benefit and defined 
contribution schemes. Relatedly, this also means to offer any meaningful information on 
defined contribution pension investments – contract-based schemes are subsumed into the 
long term insurance category, and trust-based schemes are subsumed into the pension funds 
category. 
 The distinction that the ONS makes between short term and long term assets is quite peculiar. 
It treats as long term any asset that could be held for a long period, or indefinitely, even if in 
practice they are not. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to say that, in general, the broader ONS data conforms to the main 
trends evident in the PPF data on private sector defined benefit pension funds. Viewed together, 
we can conclude that pension funds are moving away from equities, but continuing to favour 
overseas rather than UK equities. They have moved strongly into gilts since the financial crisis, 
and significantly increased their allocations to highly liquid cash deposits. Most of the same trends 
are evident among investment by long term insurers, although the move to gilts and related 
products has been much less stark. 
The available evidence suggests therefore that pension funds are increasingly interested in risk 
management, cashflow and liquidity – bywords for short-termist investment, even if in each case 
the motives are understandable. However, it is difficult to jump from evidence of short-termist 
investment practice to the conclusion that pension funds are employing short-termist investment 
strategies. There are a large number of issues which cloud any assessment of short- and long-
termism: 
 Those responsible for pension schemes do not necessarily know exactly how their capital is 
being invested. This is clearly the case in contract-based DC schemes, run by insurance 
companies, but also most trust-based DB and DC schemes, within which investment is out-
sourced to asset management firms. 
 As noted above in relation to the ONS data, many assets could be held for a long period of 
time, but are invariably traded. Pension fund holdings of listed equities are an example of this. 
9 
 On the other hand, even where it appears that equities are being traded at high frequency, this 
does not mean that firms are entirely abandoning investee firms in a single transaction – 
typically they will simply be adjusting their holdings in a particular firm. 
 Some of the most controversial practices, such as derivatives investment, may appear to fuel 
short-termism in capital markets, but are also used as a form of insurance by pension funds 
which hold related ‘real’ assets. 
 Assets such as gilts can be explicitly short term in nature, or purposefully held for a short period 
of time, but in enabling public borrowing may support long term investment by the state. 
 Investment in property is often seen as an alternative to short-termist investment, and clearly is 
less liquid than gilts or listed equities, but may be fuelling short-termism in the economy more 
generally as property drains capital from productive activity. 
 Other illiquid investments, such as private equity, may ostensibly appear to be longer term 
investments, but can be fairly opaque, and therefore difficult to evaluate. 
 Infrastructure is the archetypal illiquid, long term investment. But the form of infrastructure 
investment often taken by pension funds (as discussed in the second section) means it may 
simply be replacing public investment – contributing to short-termism in the management of the 
public finances. 
Clearly, the essence of long-termism cannot be found in any particular type of asset class or 
investment practice. Crudely, genuinely long term investment encompasses accepting a degree of 
uncertainty in investment decisions, rather than simply risk (Keynes, 1937). Returns, and potential 
losses, from investment therefore cannot be accurately predicted, or hedged. The possibility of 
significant returns depends on the investment itself, or the investor, having a transformative impact 
on the recipients of the investment, or the environment within which they operate. 
The potential results of this dynamic interaction are unknowable. The problem for pension funds, 
therefore, is that their long term liabilities are very much known – meaning they tend towards 
investments which offer predictable returns. This is one of the crippling paradoxes of ‘pension fund 
capitalism’, a concept developed by Gordon Clark (2000) in recognition of the potential, collective 
economic clout of increasingly large pension funds in the UK and United States at the turn of the 
century. They have the resources to engender transformation within patterns of capital allocation, 
but an obligation not to. 
 
The coalition government’s infrastructure agenda 
The coalition government’s agenda around lengthening pension fund investment horizons focused 
principally on increasing infrastructure investment. Yet as conventionally understood, infrastructure 
investments do not necessarily fit well with funds’ growing interests in risk-management, cash-flow 
and liquidity. It often involves investments in large-scale physical assets with limited liquidity and 
uncertain returns.  
However, the coalition government focused on encouraging or ‘nudging’ funds to invest in 
infrastructure, rather than offering substantive support to overcome this key barrier. This approach 
seems likely to continue. The government’s National Infrastructure Plan signalled pension funds as 
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a key future source of infrastructure investment in the UK, yet the actual policy agenda in this 
regard amounted to little more than signing memoranda of understanding with various local 
authority funds regarding their plans to invest in some of the Treasury’s earmarked priorities (HM 
Treasury & Infrastructure UK, 2011). 
Perhaps the most high-profile activity in this area was the creation of the Pensions Infrastructure 
Platform (PIP). The PIP is an initiative led by the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) at 
the behest of the government, with the support of the Pension Protection Fund, and employing 
infrastructure specialists Dalmore as investment manager. The scheme allows pension funds to 
pool the risks associated with investing in infrastructure. Although no explicit financial target was 
announced, that only around £1 billion (a negligible proportion of total funds) has been committed 
by pension funds to date is undoubtedly a disappointing outcome. 
The PIP and similar endeavours indicated the coalition’s view that scale is the main barrier to 
pension fund infrastructure investment. Larger funds have, in theory, more capacity to diversify 
and shoulder illiquidity risks, and to retain in-house expertise on unconventional investments such 
as infrastructure. The hope was that smaller funds can replicate scale through forming investment 
consortia. Some left-leaning organisations have developed similar initiatives, such as the Investing 
4 Growth consortium (a partnership between a handful of local authority pension funds), based on 
research by the Smith Institute, the Centre for Local Economic Strategies, and Pensions and 
Investment Research Consultants (2012). 
In practice, the coalition government’s infrastructure agenda, in relation to pension funds, was 
targeted almost exclusively on reorienting the behaviour of unfunded public sector schemes. This 
bias was strongly evident in the initial membership of the PIP. Furthermore, one of the few 
substantive regulatory reforms implemented by the coalition government to enable infrastructure 
investment was the change implemented to the restrictions on local authority funds’ investment in 
partnerships (which are a common method of infrastructure investment) despite significant 
concerns about local authority pension fund governance, and the opacity of many private equity-
based investment partnerships (Berry, 2013). 
The flipside of this approach is that the possibility of private sector schemes participating in the 
coalition’s infrastructure agenda was largely discounted – not least because of the implications of 
coalition policy. The ending of ‘contracting out’ as a result of the single-tier state pension, and the 
nature of automatic enrolment regulations, signalled the coalition’s support for the decimation of 
defined benefit in favour of defined contribution provision. Because defined contribution pensions 
involve individual rather than collective investment, illiquid assets with uncertain, long term returns 
are generally highly unattractive. 
However, as the local authority change suggests, it is worth noting that infrastructure is generally 
not treated as an asset class. There are many ways to invest in infrastructure, including very 
conventional listed equity investments in infrastructure companies, and schemes rarely distinguish 
such investments when reporting asset class allocations. Moreover, while the coalition 
government’s vision is of pension funds investing in UK infrastructure, helping to rebalance the 
economy in the process, they appear more likely to invest in overseas infrastructure projects 
(MacPhee, 2014). 
Increasingly, however, investment in UK infrastructure is taking the form of securitised debt 
instruments – following the example of Australia (Inderst & Croce, 2013). It appears to be largely 
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constituted by investment in social infrastructure (typically, schools and hospitals), facilitated by 
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Australia has been more successful than the UK in persuading 
its pension funds to participate in the privatisation of social infrastructure construction and 
maintenance – which explains the coalition government’s reinvention of PFI as ‘PF2’. Through 
PF2, the state will take greater responsibility for construction risks (HM Treasury, 2012), in part to 
assuage the most common fear evident among institutional investors. 
This development might ostensibly increase pension funds’ infrastructure investment, albeit with 
several caveats. Increased investment within social infrastructure does not necessarily equate to 
greater long-termism within the economy, and the debt-based products which facilitate this 
investment are explicitly designed to offer more liquid investments with stable returns – 
undermining their transformative potential. Furthermore, we can dispute the notion that this 
represents new investment in infrastructure of any type; rather, it is replacing the state’s traditional 
role in funding infrastructure investment, and the more recent role of the banking sector in PFI 
projects. 
 
Risk-sharing: gone and soon forgotten 
The basic premise of sharing the risks in an investment is not difficult to understand. Let’s say that 
I have £100,000 worth of pensions saving, and the opportunity to invest £100,000 in a project 
which, if successful, will double my money. But what if it isn’t successful? There might only be a 
one-in-ten likelihood, for instance, that I will lose all of money – but this is actually an enormous 
risk when the outcome would be that I would have nothing left to live on in retirement. 
So, I share the investment with ten other people. Of course, this means I’m only investing £10,000 
and can only expect to get, at best, £20,000 back. But because we now have a collective pot of £1 
million, we are able to invest in ten such projects. Assuming each project has a one-in-ten risk of 
total failure, we can expect one of the projects to produce nothing. But if the other nine deliver as 
promised, the group will have made £900,000 – not quite doubling our money, but not far off. 
Moreover, if we were investing as individuals, not only would we have to forgo some lucrative 
investment opportunities, it also means that the economy loses this capital, or more precisely, the 
kind of high-risk projects that, if successful, deliver the largest economic benefit, will not attract 
sufficient investment. This is of course a highly stylised example, but it helps to shows precisely 
why risk-sharing is so important to unlocking the potential for long term investment by pension 
funds. In practice, risks have been shared by thousands of people, with decisions made on their 
behalf by trustees, with a legal duty to act on members’ behalf alone. And increasingly, regulation 
has thickened to ensure that trustees do their job correctly (discussed further in the next section). 
The problem, however, is that the UK pensions system is heading in the opposite direction, as it 
transitions rapidly from collectivised defined benefit pensions to individualised defined contribution 
pensions. Automatic enrolment mandates employers to establish a workplace pensions scheme, 
which is a very god thing, but the vast majority of employees will end up in defined contribution 
schemes. There are of course elements of both forms of provision that cloud this slightly simplistic 
picture: in defined benefit, it is actually sponsoring employers rather than scheme members that 
shoulder investment risks. In defined contribution, including (or especially) where investments are 
12 
managed directly by insurance companies, although risks are technically not shared, they are 
usually spread by investing, by default, in pooled funds. 
However, there is no doubt that long term, uncertain investments are more difficult in defined 
contribution schemes, principally due to the need for disinvestment by members at the point of 
retirement, so that they can turn their savings into a retirement income. There is no such 
disinvestment in defined benefit; in collective schemes, pensions are paid out of contributions 
coming in from working-age members. The closure of the vast majority of defined benefit schemes 
to new members, and even future accruals – meaning contributions end or decrease significantly – 
makes the benefits of risk-sharing impossible to realise in full. 
Due to automatic enrolment, defined contribution schemes will be able to rely on a steady stream 
of contributions from younger members for several decades. Yet they are unable to maximise the 
benefits of this – and the coalition government’s changes to the annuitisation process, 
implemented in April 2015, will significantly worsen this situation. The most devastating changes 
will probably be to the annuities market, as an end to compulsory annuitisation means annuities 
will become more expensive for ordinary savers (who will still need to buy an annuity to fund their 
retirement, even if they are not compelled to do so) Yet in also allowing anybody aged 55 or over 
to access their pensions saving in full, with limited tax restrictions, by intensifying the need for 
liquidity in defined contribution investments (Berry, 2014a). 
Perversely, these changes – orchestrated by the Treasury – were announced at the same time 
that the Department for Work and Pensions announced new legislation to enable ‘collective 
defined contribution’ (CDC) provision. These schemes mimic traditional defined benefit schemes 
by operating a single investment fund for all members of the schemes, that is, risk-sharing 
arrangements. There are some who believe that this move towards greater individualisation 
inherent in the coalition government's liberation agenda will actually herald a rebirth of collective 
provision, because one of the barriers to the development of these schemes in the UK has been 
that the requirement to annuitise prohibits the possibility of purchasing a nominal annuity from 
within your own scheme’s fund – without this ‘self-annuitisation’, CDC had little value. This may 
now change – and defined contribution will move even further back towards the defined benefit 
model. 
However, this account is far too optimistic. Although it is possible the reforms will enable some 
savers (probably higher earners) to establish or join bespoke investment vehicles offering a form 
of self-annuitisation, for the mass market, the need for schemes to mitigate the risks inherent in 
early withdrawal will prohibit long term, illiquid investment, even if self-annuitisation is theoretically 
possible. The prospect of CDC becoming a mass market pension product depends on greater 
compulsion, not greater freedoms. I have little incentive in sharing risks with members that may 
jump ship at any moment – and the risk that they may will have a detrimental impact on the 
investment strategy, harming both individual outcomes and the wider economy. In a CDC scheme, 
cashflow is crucial, and members must be denied the opportunity to remove a huge chunk of cash 
from the scheme any time they choose, for the sake of the fund’s investment strategy. In return for 
this constraint, individuals would receive much higher investment returns, and benefit from 
stronger scheme governance (Berry & Stanley, 2013; Pitt-Watson & Mann, 2012). The coalition’s 
liberation agenda therefore dismantles the economic basis of CDC, and with it, perhaps, the last 
hope for collective pensions provision in the UK. 
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Regulation, ageing and economic change 
The prospects for greater long term investment by UK pension funds have to be considered in light 
of the regulation of defined benefit pension fund management – and the economic and 
demographic rationale that often lies behind regulation. Various strands of regulation which are 
worth considering here: 
 The Financial Reporting Standard 17 (in force from 2000) and International Accounting 
Standard 19 (applied in the UK from 2005) regulations mean that sponsoring employers must 
recognise pension fund deficits in their reports. This makes minimising scheme deficits a 
priority for firms anxious about their own ability to raise funds on capital markets – and 
therefore investment strategies are based on minimising losses rather than maximising returns, 
and uncertainty is anathema.  
 The three-year valuation cycle for funds legislated for in the Pensions Act 2004 serves to 
reinforce short term investment horizons. Schemes are looking to minimise losses within the 
cycle – therefore problematising longer term investments – to avoid the need for deficit 
recovery action. 
 The creation of the PPF has further problematised riskier investments, as the levies schemes 
pay to fund the PPF (a form of insurance for scheme members) is calculated based on the risk 
of scheme insolvency, which is obviously higher with more uncertain investments.  
Ostensibly, the tightening of regulation has taken place in order to protect pension scheme 
members, with greater transparency and separation between funds and sponsoring employers. 
But it has also, undoubtedly, occurred to protect employers from the perceived risk of rising costs, 
in the wider context of the financialisation of corporate governance, in which short term profits and 
share value have become the principal concerns of business. One of the main (and arguably 
inadvertent) impacts of tighter regulation has been a concentration on conventional asset classes. 
It is often argued that the problem for defined benefit provision is not regulation, but rather the way 
that regulation interacts with demographic changes such as population ageing. With the maturing 
of scheme memberships, so the argument goes, full funding becomes increasingly aspirational, 
and requires a burdensome level of sponsoring employer commitment. The argument is 
profoundly flawed. Increasing life expectancy is something to be celebrated; I hear people say this 
a lot but, far too often, it is said insincerely. Although I would not dispute that ageing problematises 
certain forms of economic practice, the implication that population ageing society is problematic for 
our economy overlooks the fact that living standards have been on a steep upwards trajectory for 
several centuries – funded by the proceeds of higher productivity and economic growth. As a 
society, we can afford to live longer, and spend a lower proportion of our lives at work. 
Moreover, although significantly extended working lives are impossible for most people at the 
moment, technological change and medical advances may genuinely transform the relationship 
between age and work in the foreseeable future. At the same time, it is not inconceivable that 
problems associated with inequality, urbanisation and climate change may mean that recent 
advances in longevity actually go into reverse, or at least stagnate.  
Even if we have reached a critical moment of development whereby adjustments to some 
practices are necessary to restore the normal trajectory of growth, such adjustments seem quite 
straightforwardly achievable. Firstly, we could move towards multi-employer and industry-wide 
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defined benefit schemes, to reduce the burdens on individual employers. Secondly, part of the 
reason for the perception that ageing makes defined benefit provision too expensive is that 
employers are not operating in a level playing field. The solution is simple: make defined benefit 
provision mandatory (as defined contribution now is). It would again become part of the normal 
cost of doing business. Arguably, compulsion would be introduced most effectively at the 
European level. 
Thirdly, it seems entirely reasonable that pension entitlements could be altered in light of 
significant changes to the life expectancy of different cohorts within scheme memberships. This 
would of course mean that employee contributions would no longer be linked, inextricably, to 
pension payments at a given level. But just as future entitlements are adjusted by a formula linked 
to inflation or earnings growth, they could also be adjusted by a formula linked to scheme 
demographics (but not national demographics, which might be quite different). 
For the purposes of this paper, the point of such a change would not be to reduce pension 
entitlements. By accepting the theoretical possibility of longevity-related adjustments, scheme 
funding requirements would become much less arduous, making it more likely that schemes can 
remain invested in more lucrative, illiquid investments.  
Ironically, as things stand, pensions regulation makes such flexibility impossible – because 
regulation is framed by the notion of scheme funding, rather than scheme governance. We need to 
move towards regulation that establishes that schemes are managed in a transparent and 
democratic manner, and away from the application of evaluation criteria that is inherently 
contestable. 
Yet challenging regulatory norms will not be sufficient to enable long-termism in pension fund 
investment strategies. Financialisation itself needs to be challenged, so that the private sector's 
abdicated responsibility for the long term welfare of its employees can be re-established in the 
UK's business culture. We have too rapidly accepted the emergence of (virtually unregulated) 
defined contribution pensions as a legitimate alternative to defined benefit. Paradoxically, while the 
impact of ageing on defined benefit provisions has attracted mountains of expert attention in the 
last 20-30 years, the most important impact of ageing on pensions provision – the reduction in 
annuity values within defined contribution provision – has gone largely unnoticed.  
As such, we have arrived at quite a perverse moment in the development of the UK pensions 
system. The possibility that population ageing will make funding private pensions more difficult 
means that a partnership between employees, employers and the productive parts of our economy 
has never been more important. Long-termism is the only sensible response to population ageing. 
Yet we expect individuals alone to shoulder longevity-related risks, in a way that is economically 
harmful, as well as jeopardising individuals' retirement security. 
 
The limitations of responsible investment 
One of the most important changes to the investment environment in the last 15-20 years has 
been the clamour for responsible investment, embodied and advanced by widespread adherence 
to the United Nations’ Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI). This framework assets that 
sustainable investment returns are dependent on stable, well-functioning and well governed social, 
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environmental and economic systems, and as such ‘ESG’ issues (environmental, social, 
governance) should be incorporated into investors’ decision-making processes. 
However, it is fair to say that this agenda has manifest most of all in support for ethical investment; 
for instance, disinvesting from arms or cigarette manufacturers, or firms with poor human rights 
records. While such changes may be welcome from a moral perspective, the link to sustainability 
is tenuous. Of greater relevance is the trend towards disinvestment from energy firms dependent 
upon fossil fuels, which has also been an important part of this agenda.  
Unfortunately, issues around corporate stewardship have been the most under-developed aspect 
of the responsible investment framework. For instance, the UNPRI presents the point of 
stewardship as an opportunity to steer companies away from unethical or environmentally 
damaging activities – but offers little guidance on what a responsible corporate governance 
strategy looks like more generally. Yet the practice of responsible stewardship perhaps offers the 
most potential for instilling long-termism within pension fund investment strategies, in that it 
equates to pension fund investors working to ensure the long term health of investee companies, 
rather than focusing simply on short term share values or dividends linked to profits.  
The idea that pension funds (or their asset managers) should take an active interest in the 
companies they invest in through equity ownership has been gaining ground in the UK, with 
prominent supporters such as ShareAction, the UK Sustainable Investment and Finance 
Association, and the trade union movement in the form of Trade Union Share Owners. Trade 
unions in the United States have played an important role in encouraging a long term approach to 
stewardship among pension funds. However, this is largely due to the funded nature of defined 
benefit pension schemes in the United States – it would be a regressive step to adopt this 
approach in the UK, where unfunded public sector pension schemes offer the fairest arrangement 
for taxpayers and support the state's own role as an extremely efficient long term investor. 
One of the coalition government's main initiatives on long term investment was the establishment 
of the Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long Term Decision Making (BIS, 2012), led by 
economist John Kay. Strangely, the review did not focus on large investors within equity markets, 
such as pension funds, but rather the role of intermediaries, principally the asset management 
industry. Although it is of course correct to say that the power (and revenue streams) of asset 
managers is structurally embedded within capital allocation mechanisms, the assumption that they 
(alongside investment consultants) are the key decision-makers regarding investment strategies is 
misguided (Berry, 2014b). As such, no attention was given to determining issues such as scheme 
design, governance, or regulation. The review also paid little attention to the state's role in 
structuring the operation of equity markets. 
Instead, the review focused predominantly on the conduct of intermediaries. It therefore led to a 
series of recommendations for stronger self-regulation by the industry – the vast majority of which 
were supported by the government, and subsequently implemented by industry. The review's most 
substantive recommendation, regarding the extension of fiduciary duties to asset managers, was 
rejected by the Law Commission. It is not clear that such a change would have made a great deal 
of difference anyway – it would be difficult, or impossible, to prove that asset managers ever 
significantly deviate from the broad mandates set by pension fund clients. 
The review strongly endorsed the idea of responsible stewardship, in contrast to frequent equity 
trading. However, although there is strong evidence of improved performance of investee firms 
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benefiting from responsible stewardship by pension funds, there is is little evidence that this 
genuinely equates to greater long-termism in business practices. Stewardship typifies the 
difficulties described in the first section regarding determining what constitutes long term 
investment. Indeed, insofar as improved performance leads to higher share values, stewardship 
can in fact fuel herding within equity markets as other investors seek to benefit from share prices 
rising above-trend (Langley, 2006). Such trends underline the ambivalence of stewardship as a 
long-termist investment strategy.  
In any case, the Kay Review had very much been a Liberal Democrat initiative, under the authority 
of Vince Cable as Secretary of State for Business in the coalition government. The election of a 
Conservative majority government probably means that further progress on strengthening the 
stewardship role of pension funds is unlikely. 
 
Policy options 
Primarily, pension funds exist for their members. Generally, pensions regulations dictate that the 
financial interests of only members matter when it comes to determining how pensions saving 
vehicles should be managed. Arguably, however, this has been diluted in recent years. Within 
defined benefit provision, rules associated with employer insolvency and PPF entry mean that 
employers’ interests are favoured over their employees’ in certain circumstances, and, within 
defined contribution provision, there are concerns that the lack of scheme-level governance within 
insurer-provided schemes creates a conflict between savers and company shareholders. 
Moreover, the coalition government’s rhetoric on pension fund investments often implied that 
pension savers – particularly in certain schemes – had an obligation to support government efforts 
to nurture an economic recovery. All of these developments are regrettable, from a progressive 
perspective. The UK pensions system is dependent on private saving precisely because its state 
pension provision is so limited; as such, the interest of scheme members must be paramount in 
determining how capital is invested.  
However, this does not mean that there is no valid reason to recognise that pension schemes may 
have obligations beyond their members, that is, to the wider economy: their operations rely upon a 
financial architecture maintained by the state and, more importantly, a significant chunk of their 
capital comes via pensions tax relief. This section therefore outlines several ways in which synergy 
between members’ interests and an overall economic interest in long term investment may be 
developed and protected. 
Supporting defined benefit provision. The paper has made clear my view that defending and 
expanding defined benefit pensions provision should be our primary goal, if enabling long-termism 
in pension fund investment strategies is genuinely desired. Sharing investment risks, involving 
employers as well as employees, is the most effective way of enabling pension funds to accept the 
uncertainty inherent in long term investment. I have suggested in the preceding discussion several 
strategies that might help to support defined benefit provision, including developing multi-employer 
defined benefit schemes (so that employers may share risks with each other), and making defined 
benefit provision compulsory (to level the playing field between different firms). 
Most importantly, and most controversially, I advocate the introduction of mechanisms for 
adjusting pension entitlements in light of changes within scheme demographics. This would have a 
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substantive impact on calculations of scheme funding requirements, because funds would know 
with certainty that, if life expectancy among their members increases significantly, they have the 
capacity to either reduce expected pension payments or increase pension contributions to 
compensate, without undermining the property rights of individual scheme members. Cashflow 
considerations become less burdensome, meaning that, other things being equal, uncertain and 
illiquid investments become more attractive.  
This change would represent a significant dilution of the arrangements for managing longevity risk 
within defined benefit provision, ostensibly against the interests of scheme members. However, in 
enabling more lucrative, long term investments, in practice this approach would mean that pension 
outcomes could be significantly more reliable, as employers are less likely to need to close or 
restrict schemes. 
Collectivising defined contribution provision. It is also possible to make defined contribution 
schemes look – and crucially, invest – a little more like defined benefit schemes, especially given 
that their significantly younger age profile (at the moment) should offer opportunities for long term 
investment. The most immediate priority is ensuring transparent and democratic scheme-level 
governance throughout defined contribution provision. Where scheme governance is genuinely 
aligned with the younger demographics, long term investments will, for the time being at least, 
make business sense. 
However, the key to unlocking the potential for long-termist investment strategies within defined 
contribution provision will be enabling the large-scale adoption of CDC provision, providing for both 
risk-sharing and self-annuitisation (as discussed above). The coalition government made CDC 
possible in term of statutory provisions, but the state needs to play a much more significant 
financial role if employers with individualised defined contribution schemes are to be encouraged 
to adopt CDC. As things stand, however, it is only employers with defined benefit schemes that 
are likely to adopt CDC, in order to minimise their risks, which would be a backwards step in terms 
of supporting long term investment. Certainly, the new government should explore converting 
NEST into a CDC scheme. Of course, supporting CDC in any form would require that the 
coalition's pensions liberation reforms are reversed. 
Establishing economic renewal funds. Modifying existing forms of pensions saving in the ways 
envisaged above (even if this were a realistic prospect) will not revolutionise the investment 
horizons of pension funds. Although some progress is possible, conventional forms of provision 
are unlikely to be able to embrace the uncertainty inherent in genuinely long term investment. 
More radical options therefore need to be considered. For example, Ewald Engelen (2006) has 
suggested a mandatory levy on the surpluses of pension funds to establish locally or sectorally 
organised funds for economic renewal (justified on the basis of the ‘vague ownership’ of surpluses, 
given the significant fiscal support pensions saving attracts). These funds would invest in the long 
term productive capacity of local economies, or certain high-value industries.  
The most obvious limitation of Engelen’s proposal is that the existence of fund surpluses cannot 
be taken for granted (although they would be much more common if funding requirements were 
reformed in the way I envisage in this paper). More generally, defined contribution schemes, soon 
to be dominant in the UK pensions system, do not create surpluses. What is required therefore, is, 
firstly, a nationally organised economic renewal fund. This would not be funded by a levy on 
surpluses, but rather by near-compulsory allocations by all workplace pension schemes (they 
would have to invest in the fund if they wish to continue benefiting from pensions tax relief on 
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incoming contributions), including both defined contribution and defined benefit schemes. 
Minimum allocations could be set at a relatively low level (5-10% of fund value), and as such 
would not significantly disrupt existing investment strategies.  
The fund would be sponsored by government, with a mandate to invest in a wide range of long 
term projects. But it would be run independently, with business, trade union, local government and 
voluntary sector leaders included within its governance arrangements. Any individual or firm would 
be free to bid for investment by the renewal fund. The fund would retain an equity stake in any 
investee enterprise, to ensure pensions savers derive a long term benefit from participation. 
Although the national renewal fund would have a specific mandate to invest in projects throughout 
the UK, this does not mean that local renewal funds should not also be established. The state 
could again use the carrot of pensions tax relief to ensure that a certain proportion of all pension 
contributions are invested into a network of overlapping local pension schemes, investing 
predominantly in the geographical areas where members are based, rather than invested in main 
pension scheme selected by the employer. A more moderate version of this proposal would see 
existing pension schemes compelled to develop investment strategies more commensurate with 
the geographical location of their UK workforce – the Pensions Regulator would be empowered to 
ensure that schemes meet these requirements. 
Introducing investment bonds. A further, specific way in which pension funds could fund long 
term investment is through 'hypothecated' investment bonds. The state would borrow from pension 
funds (and other investors) in order to fund specific forms of capital investment, such as 
infrastructure. Clearly, the state is much better placed than individual pension funds, even if 
working in concert, to shoulder the risks involved in enormous and very long term investments.  
Of course, hypothecated borrowing risks crowding out other forms of borrowing, and leads to the 
suggestion that only long term capital investment is socially useful or economically beneficial, 
compared to other forms of public spending. However, if pension funds can demonstrate that 
demand for hypothecated investment bonds supplements demand for existing forms of borrowing, 
such products may represent an important part of addressing short-termism. 
Expanding the state’s role. As demonstrated above, there is much that can be done to reform 
the way that private pension schemes invest. However, instilling long-termism in the UK pensions 
system may depend most of all on a more active role of the state, or indeed a broader 
understanding of the state’s current role. Most obviously, a state pension set at a higher level 
would enable more people to take risks when investing their private pensions saving, because 
their ultimate retirement income is less dependent on the outcome of private investment. The 
coalition government sought to make private pensions saving make up a greater proportion of 
retirement incomes (through auto-enrolment and setting the new single-tier state pension at an 
incredibly low level), thereby instilling risk-aversion within private pensions. 
As well as reducing individuals’ dependence on private pensions in retirement, the state could also 
play an enhanced role in hedging investment risks for defined contribution savers by providing 
annuities (at a much higher rate than offered by the private sector, due to the state’s inherent 
advantages as a risk-hedger). Transforming the annuities market in this manner would enhance 
the ability of individuals, and those acting on their behalf, to take risks within defined contribution 
investments, because there would be less uncertainty attached to the annuitisation process. 
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